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Adding Agility to Department of Navy Acquisition 
Workforce Management in Digital Collaboration Centers 
Altyn Clark—is a troubleshooter whom leaders call to diagnose ambiguity and craft a way ahead to 
address wicked DoN problems. He uses the engineering design process, coupled with industrial 
psychology and methods of large-scale change, to assess and advance organizational systems. As 
Chief Solutions Officer of TSI, Dr. Clark invents practical and useful models, methods, approaches, 
and tools. Dr. Clark brings over 30 years of subject matter expertise in engineering, quality control 
and assurance, program and personnel management, research, logistics, human capital and strategic 
management. Dr. Clark received his PhD, MS, and BS all from Virginia Tech. 
[ac@transformationsystems.com] 
Introduction 
The Department of Navy (DoN) spends $7 billion annually on salaries and benefits 
for the acquisition workforce (AWF) that manages about $60 billion of expenditures across a 
Future Years Defense Program. To help develop smart buyers who understand that every 
person matters, every day matters, and every dollar matters, the DoN Director, Acquisition 
Career Management (DACM), has created paper-based and digital war rooms to promote 
ready, relevant lateral learning across programs and career fields. In aid of managing the 
acquisition workforce like a major acquisition program, DACM uses the war rooms to 
promote case study discussion of successful and failed programs; to enable Naval leaders 
to explore feedback loops and unintended consequences of workforce policy decisions; to 
develop approaches to better understand workload planning, affordability, and willingness to 
pay; to investigate organizational system problems in the context of larger systems; to 
develop a more comprehensive view of workforce health; and to develop cross-career field 
and cross-SYSCOM career navigators, career guides, and career paths. 
The ASN (RD&A) Program Managers’ War Rooms 
The ASN (RDA) Program Managers Workshop was created in October 2014 to 
instruct the Navy’s program managers and senior acquisition personnel in the history of 
Navy acquisition and examples of successful Navy program management. Since its 
creation, the workshop has instructed hundreds of program managers and senior acquisition 
personnel from over 70 different program offices. The workshop is an intensive five-day 
course of instruction wherein students are exposed to information relevant to their 
acquisition duties in the areas of U.S. Naval organization and history, U.S. military material 
procurement, major program management, and shipbuilding-specific roles and 
responsibilities. The course material is presented in seven paper-based War Rooms. 
1. Evolution of the Navy War Room: Chronicles the evolution of our Navy 
over its history, with analyses at critical junctures in time. 
2. Organization of the Navy War Room: Presents the organizational 
evolution of the Navy and how it is set up to operate and fight, mobilize, 
and maintain the Navy. 
3. Material & Acquisition War Room: Views the evolution of the Navy’s and 
the nation’s material establishment and acquisition history since our 
founding. Students get an intimate feel for the events of the day as they 
actually occurred (in many cases different from the conventional history). 
Provides insights into what might be needed in the next 30 years. 
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4. Shipbuilding and Modernization War Room: Addresses the unique 
requirements and challenges of naval shipbuilding and naval systems 
development. 
5. Program Management War Room: Examines how to meet the challenges 
of a major acquisition program through its life cycle, using the history, 
lessons, and tenets of three of the Navy’s most successful acquisition 
programs in the modern era: POLARIS, AEGIS, and F/A-18. Also 
includes a short vignette for program managers on technology and 
program protection challenges due to cybersecurity threats, supply chain 
malfeasance, and increasing DoD program protection requirements. 
6. Main War Room/CG(X) Case Study: Explores the national and 
international forces that shape Navy thinking. Provides a comprehensive 
view of the numerous dimensions and conditions in which a program 
manager must operate. Includes a postmortem analysis of the U.S. 
Navy’s CG(X) Program. 
7. Naval Aviation War Room: Ships are different, so we created a Naval 
Aviation war room to teach programmatic differences for aircraft that 
takeoff from and land on ships. 
The instruction in each war room also emphasizes four strategic levels of effort:  
 Deliver Lethal Capacity 
 Increase Agility 
 Drive Affordability 
 Build a Workforce to Compete and Win 
The War Rooms are replete with examples that illustrate the tension that exists 
between individual acquisition themes, and the trade-offs among them. This course has 
been characterized as being, “more about experience than academics.” The instructors 
actively encourage the students to share their experiences and points of view in extended 
discussions. Daily wrap up and course critique sessions are conducted at the end of each 
day to focus on the lessons gleaned from the instruction, and to share additional lessons 
based on the experiences of the students in their own programs. 
Development of Digital War Room Capability 
The ASN (RD&A) COMPASS Room in Crystal City, VA, has an electronic display 
system called Mezzanine, which consists of 18 vertical large screen panels and three 
horizontal panels allowing users to immerse themselves in data with layered data displays 
and multimedia capability. The system is designed to be collaborative, allowing multiple 
users to connect with their devices via WiFi or HDMI cable to add content to a workspace or 
to make virtual “sticky notes” to content during a working session. At the end of a working 
session, the workspace data can be downloaded in an Adobe portable data file (PDF) for 
archiving and sharing electronically. The bottom line is that the COMPASS Room display 
system allows us to see and share information simultaneously, so it can be compared and 
analyzed side-by-side. 
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Figure 1. ASN (RD&A) COMPASS Room 
 Each display panel can hold up to 50 images.  
 Images can be resized and moved across multiple display surfaces. 
 Video streams can be shared from your own devices wirelessly or via HDMI 
cables and shared across multiple display screens. 
 Mark up workspace content from your smart phone or tablet. 
 Save workspace content for later discussion. 
 Upload graphics and PDFs to workspaces. 
 Interact with any screen from anywhere in the room with the spatial wands. 
 Focus attention using the wand as a pointer. 
 Real-time interaction. 
The Naval Aviation war room, developed in 2017, was designed with the COMPASS 
Room in mind rather than paper-based as the previous war rooms. DACM has a plan to 
convert all the existing paper-based war rooms into the digital format.  
The Acquisition Workforce War Room 
The DoN is strong at teaching technical excellence and capturing technical lessons 
learned, as evidenced by the traditional paper-based (and soon to be digital) acquisition 
program war rooms developed by ASN (RD&A) and used to train future program managers. 
The DoN has been less strong at systematic civilian leadership development and workforce 
management lessons learned, which drove ASN (RD&A) through DACM to create an 
Acquisition Workforce (AWF) war room to complement the program rooms. Design of the 
AWF war room coincided with installation of a digital display system in the COMPASS Room 
to replace paper-based presentations. 
The content of the AWF war room includes an historical AWF timeline, beginning in 
1794 when Joshua Humphreys was the only acquisition workforce member (now there are 
about 60,000!) responsible for acquiring the Navy’s first six frigates. The timeline traces 
AWF evolution and lessons from Six Frigates through the Board of Navy Commissioners, 
the Bureaus, the First Expansion, the advent of Naval Aviation, the time Between the Wars 
1920–1940, the Second Expansion, the emphasis on Research & Development, an AWF 
Transition, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the 21st Century AWF, and into today with Naval 
Aviation—the F-35. 
The AWF war room content operationalizes the Acquisition Career Council (ACC) 
charter elements into semi-standard templates for each career field to promote information-
sharing and collaboration across career field national leaders and their action teams. DACM 
has leveraged the COMPASS Room capabilities to build career field and SYSCOM-specific 
workspaces detailing the linkages to other career fields and to the DoN AWF Strategic Plan 
objectives. DACM also identified leadership characteristics needed by every AWF member 
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in all career fields: personal mastery, interpersonal mastery, organizational mastery, and 
motivational mastery. Career field national leads are using the AWF war room to develop 
career planning guides; measures of productivity, innovation, technical excellence, and 
professional excellence; prioritized implementation and action plans; and AWF models and 
measures—all with the aim of understanding and improving the long-term health of the 
AWF.  
Visibility for Feedback Loops and Unintended Consequences 
A separate ARS 2018 paper by Ford and Clark uses system dynamics models to 
characterize decisions made about the AWF, incorporating feedback loops and unintended 
consequences. 
Visibility for Governance 
A separate ARS 2018 paper by Clark and Rosa discusses the ASN (RD&A) 
governance structure that guides strategic shaping and development of the AWF through 
National Career Field Leaders. 
Visibility for SYSCOM Manpower Planning Models 
Warfighting system demand signals articulated in U.S. National Strategy documents, 
such as the DoN 30-year shipbuilding plan, generate a certain amount of acquisition work 
that must be accomplished to get capability into the hands of warfighters. The DoN has 
allocated various domains of acquisition work among several acquisition System Commands 
(SYSCOMs).  
Each SYSCOM uses a tailored approach to translate warfighting system demand 
signals in their domain into a sequenced volume of work to be accomplished. Each 
SYSCOM’s tailored approach estimates how many people (with appropriate knowledge and 
experience levels) are needed to perform that volume of work. DoN DACM has expressed a 
need for ASN(RD&A) to have a more integrated view of these SYSCOM manpower 
estimates to promote the ability to defend AWF size and conduct trade-offs when required.  
Each of the major SYSCOMs has its own approach to translate demand signals into 
defendable workforce requirements. We do not suggest that all commands should adopt a 
single standard approach; however, we believe there are some criteria that each approach 
should adhere to in order to permit integration and decision-making at the enterprise level. 
We describe these criteria below. We recommend that each SYSCOM self-assess its unique 
approach against these criteria and if warranted, adopt a plan to address any opportunities 
for improvement they discover. 
Manpower Data/Requirements Output Criteria 
1. Explicit Assumptions: The manpower model/process uses operational 
and organizational assumptions fully revealed without vagueness, 
implication, or ambiguity. 
2. Integrate-able Across the DoN: The manpower model/process produces 
requirements fully synchronized and integrated with requirements of other 
program or project resource providers external to SYSCOM.   
3. Repeatable and Traceable: The manpower model/process is based on 
methodology that is not dependent on a single knowledgeable individual 
for execution; it can be repeated by different individuals and uses data 
that is traceable back to the original data source.   
4. Longitudinal Data Using Common Data Elements: The manpower 
model/process uses common data elements that include category (CIV, 
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MIL, KTR), Career Field, total number of FTEs, pricing per FTE, career 
level, location of work, and capability being supported; using historical 
data across prior requirements cycles instead of estimates from prior 
POMs. 
Workload Drivers Criteria 
5. Defined Workload Drivers: The manpower model/process uses defined 
workload activity drivers and indicates the type of workforce and skills 
needed to complete tasks. Aspects to consider include each task’s priority 
level; the required skill mix for task completion; demand patterns; whether 
there is a shortage in the skillset; and any uncertainty and variation 
associated with timing. 
6. Aligned Priorities (CNO, DoD, WH, etc.): The manpower model/process–
defined organizational priorities align to higher echelon priorities used in 
trade space analysis. 
7. Flexible Process: The manpower model/process is flexible and can 
update mid-POM Cycle based on changing priorities without restarting the 
whole process. 
8. Scalable Process: The manpower model/process demonstrates how FTE 
requirements adjust up and down based on change in priorities and 
impact on demand signal. 
9. Accounts for Impact to Demand Signal: The manpower model/process 
has feedback loops linking capabilities demand signal requirements with 
workforce requirements. 
10. Address Operations Impact: The manpower model/process addresses 
mission impact if less than 100% manning is funded and permits trade 
space decision analysis. 
11. Based on Standard Work Packages: The manpower model/process uses 
defined and verified measures (work packages) of required FTE’s and 
man-years to complete a micro-product (task below intermediate 
product). 
Risk Management and Trade-Off Analysis Criteria 
12. Addresses Risk: The manpower model/process defines and analyzes 
alternative manpower distributions with their operational and resource 
implications and the evaluations of various trade-off options. 
13. Considers Mission Breaking Point: The manpower model/process 
identifies a manning level at which the program/project cannot meet 
mission requirements.  
14. Minimum Sustainment: The manpower model/process expresses 
minimum FTEs to keep the unit running with sustainment operations 
only—identifies a manning level below which the program/project will not 
sustain the current level of operations. 
15. Options and Sensitivity Analysis: The manpower model/process explains 
trade-offs and how one manning decision may be affected by changes in 
another manning decision. 
- 75 - 
Integrated Total Workforce Criteria 
16. Funded/Unfunded Billets: Shows all billets and distinguishes between 
new and old, funded and unfunded.  
17. Work breakout (current, future, navy after next): The manpower 
model/process can break out work by current Navy operations, future 
Next Navy operations, and Navy After Next operations. 
18. Total Billet Count: The manpower model/process accounts for the total 
workforce (CIV, MIL, CTR) and can trace all billets, by type, to the 
appropriate end item and intermediate level products. 
19. Funding Source: The manpower model/process can distinguish working 
capital funded billets from mission funded billets.  
Leadership Engagement Criterion 
20. Leadership investment, influence, and encouragement to individuals to 
use the systems. 
Work accomplished by the DoN Acquisition Workforce (AWF) in the SYSCOMs 
enables industry partners in the value stream to construct and deliver warfighting systems. 
Delivering acquisition, modernization, and maintenance of warfighting capability to 
warfighters is the aim of this civilian-military-industrial enterprise. The outcome is readiness 
to fight and win.  
Visibility for AWF Affordability and Willingness to Pay 
Changes in the National Strategy over time have caused cyclical shrinkage and 
swelling among the ranks of the AWF. Perceptions of AWF affordability fluctuate among 
stakeholders across time. Robustly managing the AWF and telling a defendable story about 
its affordability demands the use of strategic thinking, systems thinking, industrial and 
organizational psychology, management science, engineering, and principles of major 
program management.  
ASN (RD&A) has a responsibility (SECNAVINST 5300.38, 22 July 2009) to ensure 
Acquisition Workforce (AWF) capabilities and capacity requirements are balanced with 
workload. Meeting this responsibility occurs in the context of an ever-evolving national 
conversation about affordability and willingness to pay (the relative balance among risk, 
need, value, health, and cost). Articulating a more defendable story about AWF affordability 
is an ongoing aim of the DACM and the ASN (RD&A) directorate as they seek to manage 
the AWF as a major acquisition program. 
Cogent questions include the following: At what point in time are we making an 
evaluation or a decision about affordability? What life cycle or time horizon are we 
considering as we make an evaluation or a decision about affordability? What past 
evaluations and decisions, made with what life cycle or time horizon in mind, caused the 
current state of perceived affordability? What is our organizational learning approach to 
document, manage, and learn from the knowledge, assumptions, constraints, and history 
that led to perceived affordability in the past, now, and in the future? 
Some basic economic principles also apply to our discussion of affordability: 
 sunk cost (abandoning a previous investment strategy when new information 
emerges); 
 opportunity cost (investments we don’t make because we are fully committed 
to other investments); 
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 design cost (80%–90% of life-cycle cost locks in during initial design 
assumptions); 
 do-nothing cost (“kicking the ball down the road” or not investing in favor of 
awaiting more information is a decision with implications and perhaps 
unintended consequences); 
 irrecoverable cost (a point at which we have missed the opportunity and no 
amount of money spent can recover what we lost). 
AWF affordability is an inextricably interwoven sub-factor of warfighting capability 
affordability. Using a similar framework, we define terminology for both. These definitions 
are offered to provoke critical thinking; they are not given as definitively correct.  
Affordability (in the case of both warfighting capability affordability and AWF 
affordability) is defined simply as “congressional willingness to pay.” If we as a nation 
through our elected representatives collectively decide that we are willing to incur the costs 
of any National Defense Strategy, then that strategy is acceptably affordable.  
Warfighting Capability Willingness to Pay is a function of  
 perceived risk levels based on current and future credible threats, prompting 
a need for national defense. 
 the need for specific numbers of national defense systems, now and in the 
future. 
 the value placed on national defense, perceptions of which change over time. 
 assessed health of national defense systems, current and predicted future. 
 the cost of national defense, in the current budget, future budgets, and for a 
50-year life cycle. 
AWF Willingness to Pay is a function of  
 perceived risk levels we incur based on the current and future composition 
and expertise of the AWF. 
 the need for specific numbers of AWF members, now and over time. 
 the value placed on AWF work getting done, perceptions of which change 
over time. 
 assessed health of the AWF, current and predicted future. 
 the cost of the AWF, in the current budget and future budgets, and for a 50-
year life cycle. 
Warfighting Capability Risk is a function of  
 the perceived threat levels, the slope of the threat pace curve, and the gap 
between U.S. capability and threat capability. To continue with North Korea 
as the example, we thought they were on one trajectory with ballistic nuclear 
missile capability and it appears now they may be on a steeper curve than we 
thought. Our willingness to pay may change with that change in calculus.   
 our perceived vulnerability, which is in some ways tied to threat pace, threat 
slope, and threat gap. If we didn’t feel vulnerable based on what North Korea 
was doing, we would behave differently. If we feel threatened, we perceive 
greater risk and therefore greater willingness to pay. 
 whether we have declared war or not. A formal declaration of war is an 
obvious expression of the degree of nationalu risk we feel.  
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AWF Risk is a function of  
 the likelihood that unfunded acquisition work will delay or diminish warfighting 
capability. 
 the impact of delayed or diminished warfighting capability on readiness to 
fight and win. 
 the likelihood of a critical expertise diminishing beyond the point of no return. 
 the impact on future warfighting capability of losing that expertise. 
Warfighting Capability Need is a function of  
 stated requirements for warfighting capability; the number of ships, aircraft, 
and vehicles with associated equipment, combat systems, weapons, and 
ordnance needed to support the DoN’s military missions now and in the 
future. 
AWF Need is a function of  
 the quantity of AWF work necessary to meet warfighting capability production 
requirements. 
 the AWF manpower needed to perform that quantity of work. 
 AWF productivity. 
Warfighting Capability Value is a function of  
 prevailing risk tolerance levels. 
 the political environment.  
 decision-maker connection to warfighting. For example, the number of 
congresspersons who have been in the service and have experienced what it 
means to be a warfighter influences how Congress deliberates about the 
value of national defense. 
 the degree of decision-making centralization or decentralization that exists in 
an administration or in Congress. 
AWF Value is a function of  
 current readiness and capability delivered by previous AWF. 
 future readiness and capability achieved by AWF investment today. 
 important work being performed today. 
Warfighting Capability Health is a function of  
 the assessed health of the Naval Enterprise. 
 the health of the acquisition workforce. 
 the health of the tools. 
 the health of the facilities. 
 the health of policies. 
AWF Health is a function of  
 the assessed current health and projected future health of AWF, including 
dimensions such as capability, capacity, diversity, experience, certifications, 
and training levels. 
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Warfighting Capability Cost is a function of  
 workforce costs. 
 facility costs. 
 tool costs. 
 policy costs. 
 acquired system costs. 
 contracting strategies. 
AWF Cost is a function of  
 AWF size and the associated salary, benefit, and retirement costs. 
 training and development costs. 
Expressed as conceptual functions, 
𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≡ 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑦 
and willingness to pay = 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ, 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠, 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒, 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑤𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, … ) 
𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, … ) 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, … ) 
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ =  𝑓 (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑊𝐹, 
 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑠𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝑒𝑡𝑐 …) 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑓 (𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, 𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, 
𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, …) 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐹 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≡ 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑦 
and willingness to pay = 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ, 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ   
𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑛, 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔   
𝑏𝑒𝑦𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛, 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒 … ) 
𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑊𝐹 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠,  
𝐴𝑊𝐹 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘,  
𝐴𝑊𝐹 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦, … ) 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐴𝑊𝐹, 
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𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐴𝑊𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦,  
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦 … ) 
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ =  𝑓 (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑊𝐹,…) 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑓 (𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, …) 
There are multiple levels of organizational system to which we can apply conceptual 
thinking about willingness to pay = f (risk, need, value, health, cost).  
Visibility for Different Organizational Systems of Interest  
Each level of indenture below implies a smaller subset of the national defense 
domain than the previous level. Zooming in and out from one level to another elicits different 
views of willingness to pay = f (risk, need, value, health, cost).  
I. Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Joint warfighting capability, 
readiness and sustainment levels across all services combined, including 
soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines. 
A. The Department of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Navy 
Secretariat: Naval warfighting capability, readiness and sustainment levels 
across Navy and Marine Corps combined, including sailors, aviators, and 
Marines. 
1. Navy warfighting capability, readiness, and sustainment levels, including 
sailors and aviators. 
2. Marine Corps warfighting capability, readiness and sustainment levels, 
including Marines. 
a) Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and 
Acquisition: Research, development, transition, acquisition, 
sustainment and modernization of warfighting systems (not 
warfighters). 
b) National Career Field Leaders. Shepherds of the current 
effectiveness and long term health of the entire acquisition 
workforce across Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and 
SYSCOMs. 
c) Chief of Naval Operations: Effectiveness and safety of fleets, type 
commanders, sailors, and aviators. 
d) Commandant of the Marine Corps: Effectiveness and safety of 
Marines. 
e) Program Executive Officers and SYSCOM Commanders: Jointly 
responsible for the set of AWF members under their command and 
required to use manpower planning models/approaches to convert 
warfighting demand signals into expected workload for AWF 
members and therefore project the required size of AWF Career 
Fields and projected demand signal on each core equity in Naval 
Warfare Centers. 
f) Naval Warfare Center Commanders: Responsible to maintain 
minimum threshold capability for each of their assigned core 
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equities so that the Navy maintains the ability to surge and scale 
any technology expertise as required. 
Leaders and members at lower levels in this hierarchy have different definitions and 
perceptions of the elements comprising willingness to pay than those at higher levels, and 
the objective functions and constraints perceived up and down levels may vary greatly.  
For example,  
 A SYSCOM may have a natural tendency toward an objective function that 
maximizes the performance of their organization rather than the naval 
enterprise. Every SYSCOM fights for their mission and warfighting 
capabilities, maximum fill of their manpower needs, as large an increase in 
systems and hardware as they can get, and maximum funding for their 
perceived priorities. SYSCOMs look through a different lens so they have so 
different objective functions and constraints than the Naval triad. What 
maximizing performance looks like from a SYSCOM chair differs from an 
OPNAV chair. 
 For a program or person responsible for a mission area, the more they can 
do in that mission area the more effective they are perceived to be. 
Maximizing that mission area, however, may not make sense when you look 
across all the mission portfolios having limited resources that you can invest.  
 National career field leaders are charged with improving career field 
productivity, innovation, and professional and technical excellence. It is at 
least conceivable that attempts to optimize the performance of one career 
field will negatively impact the performance of another, and the unintended 
consequence may be invisible to both national leaders.  
 A similar line of thinking applies around service components depending 
geographically where the conflict is believed to occur, and the type of units 
required to confront it. We have spent the last 15 years in the desert and the 
Navy has been the bill recipient or payer for people on land. If North Korea 
kicks off, it is more a maritime role you are going to see that comes up. So, 
there is a trade space between Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the next level 
down you are going to have what level assets and platforms you are going to 
need to impact trade space options.  
 A similar situation applies to Warfare Centers, which have very challenging 
objective functions. They strive to maintain minimum threshold core equity 
capability without dedicated mission funding, that is, market and sell core 
equity products and services to program managers in the hopes there will be 
enough buyers to maintain the core equity. WFC objective functions and 
constraints leave much room for well-intended suboptimization.  
This line of reasoning leads strongly to a recommendation that future ACC meetings 
and AWF Summits be conducted in the AWF war room so that Navy leaders may have 
these trade-off discussions surrounded by more data from the larger system with 
appropriate context. The model makes for a good acquisition workforce summit discussion 
about how complex AWF affordability is and how one size does not fit all and it is about 
having the conversation to understand those impacts.  
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Visibility for Strategic Options When Exploring the Trade Space  
Recall that the aim of developing and exploring this conceptual model is to architect 
and evaluate possible options for action and for future states and select a preferred way 
ahead. The options approach considers multiple possible decision pathways in an uncertain 
environment and allows for making mid-course corrections when new information emerges. 
Traditional decision models assume a single static decision, while real option analysis 
assumes a multidimensional series of options where leaders have the flexibility to adapt 
given feedback loop impacts from previous decisions or a new change in the enterprise 
ecosystem. If we are in the face of investment or cost decisions, there are at least three sets 
of options below that we could pursue.  
People Levers. Here are some people levers that we as leaders could turn or crank. 
1. DAWIA certifications 
2. Professional certifications 





8. Government rotations 
9. Industry rotations 
10. Transition & retrain 
11. Partner with other government/industry 
12. Job swaps 
13. LDPs 
14. Succession planning 
15. Mentoring 
16. Recognition 
17. Rewards Shaping through early outs: VSIP/VERA 
Workload Levers. Here are some things we could do with workload.   
1. Better tools 
2. Accelerated acquisition 
3. Change ACAT level 
4. Reduce documentation requirements 
5. Better Buying Power guidance 
6. Commonality 
7. Redundancy 
Tool Levers. Here are some tool levers that we could invest in.  
1. Talent management 
2. DCPDS 
3. eDACM 2.0 
4. DAWIA Operating Guide revision 
5. AWTAP 
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6. DAWDF 
7. ACQ Demo 
8. AWQI 
9. Career navigators 
10. USC Title X Chapter 87 1701-18xx 
Visibility for Career Navigators, Career Guides, and Career Paths  
Equipping AWF members and leaders with useful tools to envision several possible 
alternative career progressions provides a tremendous benefit to the individual and to the 
Navy. DACM has developed a Career Navigator tool that for that purpose. Career Navigator 
provides at-a-glance guidance regarding eight key dimensions of a career (see Table 1) 
across time, spanning from Entry and Journeyman to the Expert and Senior Leader phases. 
Table 1. Career Navigator Dimensions 
 
The Career Navigator tool can help guide people in journaling their respective career 
paths; envisioning positions they might want to hold in the future; developing actionable 
plans to become competitive for those positions; and tracking progress. It is a planning tool 
for career steering regardless of career field, current position or years of experience. 
Anyone can use it, both inside and outside the AWF, since the principles upon which it 
stands are universally applicable. Additionally, each national career field leader is chartered 
to provide career path guidance within their career field.  
Visibility for Measures of AWF Health 
There are thousands of measures (metrics) that have been used or can be used to 
assess an organization’s workforce “health.” Industry and government leaders often find it 
challenging to select the best portfolio of workforce measures that provide the information 
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that they need to make good data-based strategic and operational workforce management 
decisions without overburdening the organization with research, data mining, and reporting 
requirements. There is no magic list of the best workforce health measures; however, there 
are frameworks that can help.   
The Human Capital Management Cycle Framework  
The Human Capital Management Cycle Framework defines a healthy workforce as 
one that is productive, innovative, and excellent as a result of the 
program/organization/career field successfully executing the critical human capital 
management processes associated with each phase of the human capital management 
cycle and achieving the end goals associated with each phase (see Figure 2). “Employing 
Measures in Managing Acquisition Workforce Health” begins by defining the phases of the 
human capital management cycle, the specified end goal statements for each phase, and 
key human capital management processes that are performed in each phase. The end goal 
statements are a starting point for program/organization/career field leader discussions; 
leaders may choose to tailor the current statements or adopt new end goals to best fit their 
organizations if desired. In the Human Capital Management Cycle Framework, measures of 
the quality and timely execution of the key human capital management processes (or 
progress status of processes that are being developed but have not been fully implemented) 
associated with each phase are predictive of the likelihood that the phase end goal will be 
achieved. The measures associated with the end goals taken at the end of the established 
goal time-period are the resulting lagging measures. 
 
Figure 2. Human Capital Management Cycle Framework 
The Enterprise Performance Measurement Framework 
Leaders typically limit assessment of their organization’s workforce health to 
evaluating how well the program/organization/career field performed internal human capital 
processes to achieve internal human capital goals; the Human Capital Management Cycle 
Framework. The Human Capital Management Cycle Framework alone is an adequate 
approach; however, a measurement system based on the Enterprise Performance 
Measurement Framework accounts for various factors outside of internal human capital 
process performance that may influence an organization’s human capital goal achievement 
and workforce health. The Enterprise Performance Measurement Framework also attempts 
to provide assurance that the workforce is delivering desired results to support the 
organization’s external customers/stakeholders and the enterprise mission; the driving 
purpose for the workforce and an organization to exist. Assessing workforce health from the 
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larger Enterprise Performance view instead of from the narrow internal perspective of the 
Human Capital Management Cycle Framework only results in leaders developing internal 
human capital goals and metrics that are aligned with both higher level plans/goals and 
customer/stakeholder needs. In addition, the enterprise perspective helps leaders focus the 
organization’s attention and energy on changing internal processes and external factors that 
are within their span of control to improve organization workforce health. An enterprise view 
also provides leaders with a measure of assurance to help determine whether current and 
future levels of workforce capacity and capability are adequate to meet customer product 
and service requirements. Finally, an Enterprise Performance Model–based metrics portfolio 
enables individual organizations to better articulate how their human capital process 
performance, trade space decisions, and ultimately their workforce’s performance, 
innovation, technical excellence, and professional excellence contributed to overarching 
enterprise mission accomplishment. 
 
Figure 3. Enterprise Performance Measurement Model 
The DoN Acquisition Workforce Health Measure Framework (in Context of 
National Strategy and Warfighting Performance) 
Finally, the presentation concludes with the description of a proposed Department of 
the Navy Acquisition Workforce Health Measurement framework based on the Enterprise 
Performance Measurement Framework discussed in the previous section. The framework 
depicts “real world” elements that impact the management of Navy Acquisition organizations 
and the Navy Acquisition workforce, actual products and services that acquisition 
organizations produce and deliver, and a representation of the various customers that use 
acquisition products and services to ultimately ensure warfighter readiness and support 
warfighters on the battlefield, in the air, and at sea. The framework begins with the U.S. 
national strategy as the linchpin that informs DoD and DoN strategic direction, plans, goals, 
and funding allocation decisions. Strategic-level acquisition organizations develop policy, 
budget plans, execution plans, and various initiatives to guide lower-level organizations in 
accomplishing their mission to help the Navy enterprise achieve DoN, DoD, and ultimately 
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U.S. strategic objectives. The framework acknowledges that most organizations that perform 
acquisition work for the Navy not only have to manage the challenges associated with an 
acquisition professional workforce, but also other related professional workforces (research 
and development, maintenance, support, and others) that may have similar or different 
goals, objectives, and needs. The Navy acquisition organization’s workforce produces 
specific products and provides specific services that contribute to the successful 
development, purchase, deployment, and sustainment of ships, submarines, vehicles, 
weapons, information technology, and other equipment used to ensure the U.S. Navy’s 
readiness to fight. These resources are employed by combatant commanders, sailors, 
marines, soldiers and airmen to win the fight.   
 
Figure 4. DoN AWF Health Measurement Framework 
As depicted in the Enterprise Performance Measurement and associated DoN 
Acquisition Workforce Health Measurement frameworks, the same workforce health 
measures may be both predictive and lagging depending on the context in which they are 
used. A measures portfolio based on these frameworks assumes the following: 
1. Measurement results of an organization’s progress in implementing 
external human capital plans, policies, and initiatives levied by a higher 
headquarters or outside agencies (e.g., OPM, DoD, DoN, Congress, etc.) 
and the amount of funding allocated are predictive of the organization’s 
level of internal human capital cycle process performance and end goal 
achievement;  
2. Measurement results of an organization’s internal human capital cycle 
process performance and end goal achievement are lagging measures of 
an organization’s progress in implementing external human capital plans, 
policies, and initiatives levied by a higher headquarters or outside 
agencies, yet at the same predictive of the organization’s capability to 
consistently deliver quality products/services within the time required by 
customers/stakeholders and within budget 
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3. Measurement results of an organization’s product/service quality, 
timeliness, and cost are lagging results of human capital cycle end goal 
achievement, but also a predictive measure of the organization’s external 
customer/stakeholder’s performance satisfaction and success and 
enterprise mission accomplishment. 
A lagging measure of total AWF population can be predictive of the organization’s 
likelihood to achieve adequate levels of personnel in the Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) 
workforce. In turn, total CAP population measures may allow leaders to predict if the Key 
Leadership Position (KLP) workforce will be adequately staffed to meet customer demands. 
The total population of each category of workforce is driven by hiring and retention. 
Therefore, measures of the success of hiring processes, staff addition rates, departure 
rates, promotion rates, and retention rates would all be examples of predictive measures 
used to assess the organization’s progress toward meeting desired total population goals in 
each category. In the context of the Enterprise Performance Measurement and associated 
DoN Acquisition Workforce Health Measurement frameworks, measures of an organization’s 
implementation of strategic initiatives aimed at improving hiring efficiency and increasing 
retention would be predictive of the likelihood that the organization would achieve total 
population goals in each category. The lagging total population results in each category 
would then be predictive of the likelihood that the acquisition products delivered by the 
organization would meet customer quality and timeliness expectations. The lagging product 
quality and timeliness measures (e.g., voice of the customer survey feedback, frequency of 
meeting product quality and delivery timelines specified by law, policy, or customer demand, 
etc.) then become predictive measures used to proactively assess the organization’s impact 
on overarching mission and warfighter success.   
Closure 
The DoN Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM), has created paper-
based and digital war rooms to promote ready, relevant lateral learning across programs 
and career fields so that SYSCOMs, PEOs, national career field leaders, and their teams 
can move smartly and systematically toward managing the 60,000-member acquisition 
workforce like a major acquisition program. 
For Further Study 
DACM is rapidly exploring innovative ways to promote 
 More emphasis on defining and measuring Program and AWF outputs and 
outcomes 
 Judicious application of system dynamics models to appropriate problem sets 
in all career fields 
 Continued exploration of workload forecasting models tied to changing 
demand signals from the 30-year shipbuilding plan 
 Development of talent management systems and toolsets to shape and 
manage AWF composition 
 Transition to Virtual War Rooms with shared data display across multiple 
geographies 
 Understanding the half-life of knowledge and the refresh rate required to 
maintain currency 
 Defining the characteristics of a fully developed professional in all career 
fields 
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 Better defining the pool of candidates available for succession planning 
purposes 
 Better understanding the qualities needed in key people, beyond technical 
training. 
www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
 
 
